Does Wealth Influence Women’s Labor Participation Decision?: Evidence from Egypt by El-Hamidi, Fatma
Draft (Do not quote) 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Wealth Influence Women’s Labor Participation 
Decision?: Evidence from Egypt1
 
 
 
 
 
Fatma El-Hamidi 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh, PA 
 
Tel: (412) 372-0895 
Fax: (412) 372-5324 
E-mail: fatma@pitt.edu
 
 
 
 
 
 
August, 2004 
                                                 
The author is grateful to Ragui Assaad and Deborah Levison for invaluable guidance. 
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 11th annual ERF conference in Marrakesh, Dec. 
2003. The author is grateful to comments made by Heba El-Laithy, Lynn Squire, and Insan Tunali. 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the behavior of labor supply of women at different levels of 
household wealth status. It is widely demonstrated in the literature that variables such as 
age and level of education, as well as the demographic, social, and financial 
characteristics of the household influence deciding to join the labor market. However, 
this study argues that these determinants work differently according to the level or the 
well-being of the household, adding another to the literature on women’s labor supply in 
MENA. 
There have been  few studies on women’s labor supply in the MENA region. Some have 
focused on labor supply and its elasticities in Egypt and Turkey [El-Hamidi (2003), and 
Tunali and Baslevent (2000)]. Others have focused on the fertility and timing of marriage 
in Morocco [Assaad and Zouari (2003)]. Household wealth is yet to be considered in the 
labor supply analysis. 
Only recently a couple of studies have handled the role of poverty in labor supply. 
Eberharter (2001) shows a difference between the gender role in the labor market 
between those above and below the poverty line in Germany. Dessing (2002) points to 
different labor supply elasticities for different wage rates in the Philippines.  
I start with the assumption that social and traditional gender roles, as well as economic 
factors, govern women’s participation decision in the labor market. This assumption is 
sustained only when household income/ wealth is above a specific threshold. When 
household income falls below some threshold, only economic factors matter in the 
decision to join the labor market. Ultimately, economic hardships are likely to press 
women to work more hours. In this paper, there is evidence that responsiveness of hours 
of work, resulting from a change in wages, vary according to wealth level of the 
household. Several policy implications emerge from negative labor elasticity: the need to 
impose a minimum wage to avoid repeated cycles of poverty, as well as providing 
specialized training and education programs. 
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1. Introduction 
Women labor has become an important factor in household income, thus improving the 
living conditions of double earnings families, and providing a barrier against economic 
instability and high levels of men’s unemployment. Besides, as women become more 
economically independent and contribute more to family subsistence, power within the 
household tend to be more liberated, further improving the social status of women [Babb 
(1990)].  
 
The focus on women’s supply in Egypt is motivated by two simple facts:  first, while 
women represent at least half the population in Egypt, they account for 27% of total 
workforce2 compared with 73% of their men’s counterparts3 in 1998. Second, is the 
liberalization of the economy, and implementation of stabilization and privatization 
policies required by the IMF. The Egyptian practice of public sector employment 
guarantee continued for decades and offered the highest rewards of education and 
experience in the labor market. Until the mid 1980s, and despite partial liberalization in 
the mid 1970s, known as the “open door policy”, the public and government sectors 
dominated the labor market by absorbing greater numbers of educated and experienced 
workers. The decade between 1988 and 1998 witnessed a rise in the pace of liberalization 
towards a market-led economy. Public sector employment guarantee came nearly to an 
end by early 1990s, and employment in the public and government sectors started to 
decline. The burden of these restructuring policies is heavily borne by women, either 
directly or indirectly. If Egypt is to make effective use of its wealth of population, these 
shares have to change, which cannot be achieved unless women engage in the labor force 
in greater numbers.  By understanding women’s participation behavior, policy makers 
will be in a position to assess the likelihood of satisfying this adjustment, forming 
effective policy prescriptions, and drafting proposals to invoke work incentives.  
 
The analysis in this paper focuses on urban women, ages between 15 to 64. The choice of 
this subsample leads to rather reliable results, urban women are most likely to be engaged 
in government and public sector jobs that are heavily affected by the privatization 
policies.  
 
The objective of this paper is to test the assumption the canonical model of labor supply 
does not work at low levels of wages (or income). The second objective is to test if 
factors that determine labor supply decisions differ according to the economic well-being 
of the household where the worker lives. In this study, I argue that labor supply 
elasticities differ according to the level of wealth of the household where the worker 
lives. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 is a theoretical background on 
the labor supply model and the new research on the link between poverty level and the 
decision making process. Section 3 presents a review of the literature. Section 4 lays out 
the econometric model.  Section 5 covers the data and variables handling. Section 6 
                                                 
2 15 years or older 
3 Source: ILO Bureau of Statistics, for 1998. 
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discusses empirical findings. Finally, Section 7 provides closing remarks and 
recommendations. 
 
2. Theoretical Background: 
The traditional, or canonical, labor supply model views a family as a single decision 
making unit, and any factor affecting the husband’s role in the labor market, provokes a 
response in the woman’s labor participation decision. In other words, women assume a 
secondary role with regard to the labor supply of the family. 
Some empirical studies have shown that at low levels of income the substitution effect 
dominates, resulting in a positive elasticity of labor supply (raising wages raises hours of 
work). At high wage levels, the income effect dominates resulting in a negative elasticity 
(raising wages reduces hours of work). As a result, the labor supply schedule takes the C 
shape (backward bending) [Robins (1930)].  
 
The drawback of this model is that it does not offer a clarification on whether, and to 
what extent, these effects differ at different levels of wages or income . Dessing (2002) 
shows how this traditional labor supply model fails to capture the behavior of poor 
workers. In practice, especially in the developing world, as wages fall, workers work 
longer hours to maintain a living wage, representing negative labor supply elasticity. 
 
During the 1960’s, there was evidence of negative labor supply (long hours of work at 
low wage levels). This development resulted in a backward bending labor supply 
schedule occur at low levels of income [Berg (1961)]. Most of the research done during 
that period focused on farmers and peasants which were presumed to have different needs 
and desires, therefore different preferences for work and leisure time. According to Berg 
(1961), Myrdal (1971), and Lipton (1983), those workers preferred leisure over work 
once they reached the minimum level of subsistence income, after which they reduce 
their work hours. Others such as Schultz (1964), Miracle and Fetter (1970), Gollas (1972) 
and Miracle (1976) offered a different interpretation. They argued that poor living 
conditions at those times and high rates of mortalities were enough incentives for workers 
to go back home once they satisfied their minimum needs. Others went a different route. 
Hanoch  (1965), Barzel and McDonald (1973), and Sharif (1991), among others, used the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function to explain the negative elasticity of supply at low wages. 
 
The Reversed S-Shaped Labor Supply Model:  
Dessing (2002) provides a different interpretation of negative labor supply elasticity. One 
of the basic assumptions of the canonical model, is the reservation wage is a primary 
factor in determining whether to participate in the labor market or not. The reversed S 
shaped model, however, assumes at very low levels of income, the family must devote all 
capable members to engage in work to cover their basic needs. This is what Dessing 
referred to as “forced employment”. At income below the subsistence level, only the 
income effect dominates, and leisure is considered a luxury good, producing a labor 
supply that is negatively sloped. When basic needs are met, the labor supply shrinks 
(backward bending portion) that is when workers decide to free some of their market 
work time for leisure or homework. 
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The canonical model emerges when family income exceeds subsistence level. The labor 
supply schedule slopes upward suggesting a positive substitution effect, then slopes 
backward because of a negative income effect. At extremely low levels of income, the 
family cannot cover expenses necessary to engage in the labor market (transportation, 
clothes, …), and in exceptional cases, some family members may not be able to maintain 
the physical effort needed to complete the job and they are trapped into “forced 
unemployment”. 
 
Employment in urban Egypt is dominated by government and public sectors as the 
primary employer, where working hours in these institutions are fixed in general (Assaad, 
2002). Therefore, full-time, primary wage earners in urban families seldom change their 
work hours with changes in wages. Secondary workers on the other hand, which includes 
married women and older children, also called “supplementary” or “added” workers, 
work at low levels of wages to meet basic needs. The traditional role of women in Egypt 
is mainly to produce for the family: caring for other family members, and ultimately 
responsibility for the survival of the family. That is why near the subsistence level, 
families increasingly depend on the added income of the secondary workers. Domestic 
work remains the responsibility of the woman even after joining the labor market and 
working long hours. That puts an added burden on women. That load converts to an 
incentive to lessen the long working hours when basic needs are met, to further improve 
the welfare of the family by taking care of the domestic activities. At intermediate levels, 
they withdraw from the labor market and substitute work with leisure. The substitution 
effect dominates, and they experience a positive elasticity of labor supply. At higher 
levels of income, several domestic tasks are transferred to the market, which concurrently 
free some hours for women to spend in the labor market. Besides, people engage in new 
consumption patterns and social status calls for joining the labor market.  
 
 
3- Review of the Literature: 
Women labor supply studies on the US and other advanced countries are many compared 
with those of developing countries. These studies have produced a wide-range of 
conflicting estimates of labor supply elasticities on wages and income. In their 
comprehensive survey of that literature, Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) conclude 
estimates of women labor supply elasticities in these contexts are large, both in absolute 
terms and relative to men’s elasticities.  The wage elasticity estimates vary widely from –
0.85 to over 14, depending on the data source, the sub-populations studied (which vary 
by age group, marital status, and race) and the statistical methodology used.  
Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) list a wide range of positive estimates of wage 
elasticities. Nakamura, Nakamura, and Cullen (1979) obtained a negative uncompensated 
wage elasticity.  Killingsworth (1983) attributes this result mainly to excluding the 
schooling variable from the hours equation. Another possible source of this result is the 
lack of a work experience variable in the wage equation, and/or the selection terms.   
 
Most studies of women’s labor supply in the developing world focus on the labor force 
participation decision rather than the hours-of-work decision, therefore elasticity.   
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Sahn and Alderman (1988) estimate a labor supply function for Sri Lankan men and 
women using 1980-1981 data. They found the elasticity of labor supply for wages is 
positive and lower in urban than rural areas (0.14 for rural men, 0.07 for urban men, 0.15 
for rural women, and 0.03 for urban women).   
 
Connelly, DeGraff and Levison (1997) compared the determinants of participation in 
employment with the determinants of hours worked for urban Brazilian women using 
1985 household survey data.  Because there are large proportions of households headed 
by unmarried women in Brazil, the authors divided their sample into women whose 
husband was present and single women heads of households.  They found the 
unobservable factors that increase the likelihood of employment of single women heads 
caused their hours of work to decrease, once employed.  For women with spouses, 
unobservable factors worked in the same direction for both participation and hours 
worked.  
 
Dessing (2002) analyzed 99 low income rural households between 1975 and 1976 in the 
Philippines. He reported negative elasticities of -0.39 to -0.46 for secondary workers in 
the household. Assaad and El-Hamidi (2001) produced elasticity estimates for Egyptian 
women using 1988 data. They found a 10% increase in wages results in a 3.4% increase 
in hours of work. In summary, the existing research points to low elasticities of women’s 
labor supply for wages in developing countries.  
 
Alas, these studies did not consider testing for labor supply elasticities at wealth rates or 
income levels. Few studies reported differences in labor supply elasticity by wage level.  
Sharif (1991) studies wage and self-employed labor supply elasticities of landless and 
near landless farmers in India using 1970 and 1971 data. His data showed a forward 
falling labor supply schedule at low wage levels and an upward sloping schedule at 
higher wage rates. But he does not show if this falling forward occurs below subsistence 
level. Dessing (2002) found a negative elasticity for women at low wage rate (-.39). 
Eberharter (2001) also found differences in participation practices between women below 
and above the poverty line in Germany. 
 
4. The Econometric Model 
The impact of labor market conditions on the labor supply decision is typically captured 
by the wage rate that depends on the individual's education and labor market experience 
[Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Sahn and Alderman (1988), and Schultz (1995)]. 
According to of labor supply theory, the participation decision is based on a comparison 
of the market wage a woman earns and her reservation wage, the wage below which no 
labor is supplied [Killingsworth (1983), and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986)].  The 
reservation wage is related to the opportunity cost of a woman’s time at home (or in 
unpaid work), her unearned income, as well as other factors that may affect her 
preference for paid work, relative to other time uses. Thus, the labor supply function may 
be written as a function of the wage rate, other earnings and preferences.  
 
While an increase in the wage rate clearly increases the likelihood of labor force 
participation, the effect on the number of hours supplied is not as obvious, since both 
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income and substitution effects come into play. The final decision depends on the 
marginal utility of consuming market goods and services purchased with wage income, 
relative to that gained from added “leisure” time. This puzzling connection between labor 
force participation, the wage rate, and hours of work creates the need to know how hours 
respond to wages, if at all. 
 
One of the problems typically discussed in labor supply models is selectivity bias. 
Selectivity bias in wage and labor supply models was first discussed by Gronau (1974), 
Lewis (1974), and Heckman (1974). They argued that employed workers are those who 
are offered higher “market” wages than their “reservation” wages.  As a result, the 
subsample used for determining of wages and hours of work represents a non-random 
sample of the population.  As Vella (1998) explains: selectivity bias is a result of the 
unobservable characteristics that is correlated in both wages and hours equations. 
 
Heckman (1980) suggested a solution [Heckit], which is used here. By identifying two 
equations: the selection (participation) equation, which models the probability of 
engaging in paid work for all the observations in the sample using standard probit/ ML 
technique to single out the employed from the non-participants. To correct for sample 
selection, parameter estimates from participation equations are used to estimate a variable 
λ (called the selection term), is then included in the outcome equation, which applies only 
to those who are observed in paid work.  In this analysis, the observed outcomes for those 
who engage in paid work are either hours or wage.  Although the Heckman selection 
model is written for hours of work H, the same equations apply well to the wage W. This 
procedure presents the advantage that it solves simultaneously the two problems that 
appear when estimating a simultaneous equation model, sample selection (selectivity) 
bias and endogeniety. 
 
Finally, and once selectivity-corrected reduced form wage and hours equations are 
obtained, structural versions of the labor supply equations can be estimated by 
introducing the predicted wage as a regressor in the hours equation. This is referred to as 
estimation procedure (VII) by Killingsworth and Heckman.  
 
Because of the joint determination of wages and hours of work equations, there are two 
issues to be considered. First, if wages and hours of work are simultaneously determined, 
it is inappropriate to use actual wages in the hours equation.  Second, the wage equation 
has to include variables excluded from the hours equation so the predicted wage will not 
be perfectly collinear with the hours equation regressors. To account for the parabolic 
relation between age and the life- cycle of labor supply decisions, the age-squared is used 
as an independent variable. Fuchs (1989), and other empirical studies show that women 
experience a shorter and more interrupted spells of labor market attachment, than men. 
Therefore, the influence of squared age on women’s labor supply is expected to be weak 
(and probably negative). Regional differences in labor opportunities are captured by 
regional dummies. Where Greater Cairo is the reference, Alexandria and Suez Canal 
Cities, Urban Upper Egypt and Urban Lower Egypt are three other dummies. 
 
The estimated hours and wage equations may be expressed as: 
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(1) ln(w) =  δxw' x w + δw'  + ξ λˆ w , 
 
(2)  lnh =  δxh' x h  + δV V   + δw ln(ŵ) + δh' + ξ λˆ h . 
 
Here, xw stands for the vector of regressors in the wage equation (age, age-squared, 
experience, experience-squared, education dummies, region dummies, and the estimated 
λ to correct for selectivity); and xh denotes the vector of regressors in the hours equation 
other than the wage (age, age-squared, education dummies, and other factors that 
influence hours of work, but not the wage rate, such as: the number of children, other 
men’s earnings V – a proxy for non-labor—, and the estimated λ.). The hats (“^”) 
indicate the estimated versions of theλ‘s are being used and ξ is a zero-mean, 
heteroskedastic disturbance term, which is uncorrelated with the right hand side 
variables. The wage equation includes dummy variables that distinguish between 
different regions of residence. Since there is no theoretical reason justifying including of 
region dummies, they are excluded from the hours equation. Linear regression of (1), (2), 
and the generated regressors λˆ  would yield consistent estimates of the regression 
parameters. The structural version of the hours equation allows to estimate wage 
elasticity. This linear specification of the hours equation is the most often used form in 
the literature. It is hypothesized to see different patterns of participation to vary according 
to the level of wealth/ income. 
 
Based on the previous discussion, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to own wage 
wi, usually called the gross or uncompensated wage elasticity, is assumed to be negative 
for workers at the lower end of the wealth continuum. According to the standard 
neoclassical labor supply model, the elasticity of labor supply hi with respect to other 
men’s earnings V, and the number of children, should be negative if leisure is a normal 
good.   
 
5. Data and Variables 
The empirical analysis is based on a 1998 nationally representative4 household survey, 
Egyptian Labor Market Survey (ELMS). The survey includes extensive data on basic 
demographics, employment, unemployment, occupational history, migration, education, 
earnings, and parental background. The ELMS 1998 was conducted on a sample of 5,000 
households.  
The survey collected data on hours and earnings.  For regular workers (defined as 
continuously employed workers), annual hours of work were estimated by multiplying 
the average number of hours per day and the average number of days per week by the 
number of weeks worked per year.  Wages for these workers were then estimated by 
dividing annual earnings by this estimate of annual hours.   For irregular workers with 
more periodic employment, the reference year was divided into four quarters and the 
workers were asked about the number of months worked per quarter, the average number 
of days worked per month, the average number of hours worked per day, and the average 
wage per day each quarter.   An estimate of the number of hours worked per year was 
                                                 
4 In all but the five remote border governorates. 
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then obtained by adding the estimated quarterly hours.  The hourly wage was obtained by 
dividing the average daily wage over the four quarters by the average length of the 
working day across the four quarters5. 
In contrast to the number of days worked per month, neither of these two variables varies 
much across quarters resulting in reliable estimates of hourly wage for irregular workers.  
There is, however, a significant room for measurement error in estimating work hours for 
irregular workers using this method because of recall problems and possibly some desire 
by such workers to under-report the number of hours they supply.  However, the low 
proportion of irregular workers among women wage workers (2%) makes such 
measurement problems trivial. 
 
As widely agreed upon, the more educated women, the more likely to be employed. To 
account for the strong correlation between human capital and labor supply, dummies for 
the highest level of education reached are included. They are: illiterate (the reference 
category), able to read and write, primary education, preparatory education, secondary 
education, university education, and post graduate education. Experience (calculated as 
the number of years since entering the labor market for the first time), and experience 
squared/100 are two independent variables in the wage equation. As widely known, 
experience is considered one of the factors in wage determination. 
 
Studies of women in developing countries confirm that it is a common practice in the 
literature on the economics of women’s labor supply to account for individual and 
household characteristics that limit an individual's labor supply, such as the number of 
children, and wealth, or unearned income. Such information on household composition 
has been known to capture constraints and/or preferences regarding participation. The 
argument is that children affect one’s current taste for working by raising the value of 
home time, but not one’s value to an employer. I follow the mainstream of the literature 
and include the number of children 0-2 and the number of children 3-6, in the analysis.  
 
Because the survey does not provide a measure of unearned income, another instrument 
is used: the sum of total earnings of other adult men family members in the same 
household, on the assumption that, in Egypt, men employment decisions are exogenous 
to those of their women’s. A significant and negative coefficient on other men earnings 
underlines the complementary role of leisure and income, if leisure is a normal good. 
Zabel (1993) for example, obtained a negative relationship between individual’s annual 
working hours and the household’s income situation. 
 
The variable used to measure the wealth of the household where the worker lives is 
proxied by a wealth score that is constructed using principle component analysis “Factor 
analysis”6. The wealth variable is a combination of three types of indicators: durable 
goods, housing assets, and financial assets.  Durables include measure such as: fridge, 
freezer, TV, etc. Housing assets include: flooring types, number of rooms, access to 
                                                 
5 The survey did not provide wage data for the self employed. To get around this problem, wages for self 
employed were predicted after running Heckman selection equation, and then plugged into the wage 
variable. 
6 This method is adapted from Assaad and Levison (2003), and Filmer and Pritchett (2001). 
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electricity, etc. The financial assets contain: dividends on assets or interest on bank 
accounts. 7
The main use of principal component analysis is to reduce the size of a data set while 
retaining as much information as is possible. It calculates a compact and optimal 
description of the data set. The first principal component is the linear index of all the 
variables that captures the largest amount of information that is common to all the 
variables and explains the greatest amount of variation. 
 
Table A-1 in the appendix lists scoring coefficients for the wealth factor using maximum-
likelihood estimation technique, without rotation, and keeping one factor. This factor 
captures the most common information between variables. This index has a mean of zero 
and standard deviation of 0.9438. A change from zero to one increases the asset score by 
(scoring coefficient / S.D.) of the variable. For example, a household that owns a fridge 
has an asset index that is 0.35 higher than a household that does not. Owning a car raises 
a household asset index by 0.18 units and so on. A new variable is then created 
containing the percentiles of the factor score—that is the wealth index. I set up cutoff 
values for the wealth index and sort individuals accordingly. The cut off values are set 
arbitrarily at lowest 20th percentile, 20th-40th percentile, 40th-60th percentile, 60th-80th 
percentile, and highest 20th percentile (80th-100th). 
 
Table A-2 in the appendix displays the means of the assets included in first principal 
component for private wage workers and self employed, for each cut off category. Some 
large differences appear to the average ownership of these assets. For example, owning a 
kerosene stove is 84% for the lowest 20th percentile, and it is almost non existing at the 
highest 20th percentile (1%). Having water heater on the other hand is almost universal 
for the highest 20th percentile (96%), and it makes up 0% for the lowest 20th percentile. 
Some assets have minor differences between all five groups such as: having access to 
piped water. 
The difference in the average index between 20th-40th percentile category and lowest 20th 
percentile category is 1.07. An example of a combination of assets that would produce 
this difference is owning an electric fan (0.449), owning a fridge (0.304), and the 
availability of waste collection (0.203). The average asset index is 0.563 units higher for 
those in the 40th- 60th percentile than those in the 20th-40th percentile. This difference is 
equal to having a sewing machine (0.183) and access to waste collection (0.383). 
                                                 
7 A complete list of wealth measure in Table ( A-1) 
8 Theoretically, this index is a standardized variable with mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. 
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Using the asset ownership as a proxy for wealth (or income level) is a robust one. It 
accounts for the status of the household during a long period of time. As previously 
mentioned, I use different cut off points for the wealth indicator to compare the elasticity 
at different levels: lowest 20th, at 20th-40th, at 40th-60th, at 60th-80th and at highest 20th 
percentiles of wealth distribution.  
 
Underlying Assumptions 
There are some key assumptions in this framework: 
 Once the participation decision has been reached, there are no restrictions on the 
hours supplied. 
 The labor supply decisions of the husband is exogenous. 
 Earnings reported by other men members in the same household are considered 
assets to the woman worker, and affects her labor supply decision. 
 For this study, I assume those who fall below the 20th percentile of the wealth 
index are the poorest in the sample, followed by 20th-40th category and so on. 
Therefore, the higher the worker on the wealth index, the better-off she is in 
satisfying their basic needs. 
 
The analysis is restricted to urban9, non-agriculture10 women, between the ages of 15 and 
64, and not currently enrolled in school, working in either public or private sectors or self 
employed, comprising 7% of all urban women in 1998, and about one third of the 
working sample. Wage workers working in the government sector were dropped from the 
working sample since their working hours are not tied to their fixed wage rate11. The 
sample on which the analysis is based on consists of 4843 urban women in 1998.  
 
The analysis is also run for two combinations of the sample: one for self-employed and 
private wage workers, and another for self-employed and public and private wage 
workers, to see the effects with and without public sector employment. One reason is that 
in Egypt, the public sector is neither government nor private sector but has some 
characteristics of both sectors. Another reason is the low number of workers in that 
sector. Results of the later sample are reported in the appendix. 
 
 
6. Empirical Findings: 
 
6.1- Preliminaries 
Table (1) below (and figure A-2 in the appendix) show types of employment distributed 
by cut off values of the wealth index. Private and public wage workers represented 
almost two thirds of total working sample—the majority working for the private sector, 
with a little over half the working sample (52%), --while self-employed women 
                                                 
9 Keeping with the literature, and to avoid the problems of labor market definition associated with 
subsistence agriculture in rural areas. 
10 High rates of seasonal employment within the agriculture sector are justification for excluding them from 
the analysis. 
11 In a previous version of this paper, the government workers were included in the analysis. 
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accounted for 32%. Table (2) below displays means and standard deviations of variables 
used in the analysis for private wage and self employed workers and by the five cut offs 
of the wealth index. Figure (1) also shows average yearly working hours by type of 
employment and wealth index cutoffs. In general, the mean age of the sample is 34 years. 
Almost half the sample (49%) are highly educated, with university or post graduate 
degrees. Over half of the sample (57%) resides in two metropolitan areas: Cairo, and 
Alexandria and Suez Canal. On average, 43% of the sample has infants, toddlers, and 
children ages between 0 and 6 years. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Urban Women By Type of Employment and Wealth 
Index Cut Offs 
 
Employment Status Below 
20th 
Percentile 
20-40th 
Percentile 
40-60th 
Percentile 
60-80th 
Percentile 
80-100th 
Percentile 
Total 
 
Self Employed 37 34 9 8 12 100 
Public Wage Workers 3 3 4 18 23 51 
Private Wage Workers 32 29 25 26 50 161 
Total 72 65 38 52 85 312 
 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the Analysis, 
Private and Self Employed Workers, Urban Women, 15-64, Egypt 1998 
 
  Total Sample 
(Prv+S.emp) 
< 20 th  Percentile 20 th-40th  Percentile 40 th-
60th  
Percentile 60 th-
80th  
Percentile 80 th-
100th  
Percentile 
Variables Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Log Hourly Wage 7.55 0.68 7.59 0.75 7.58 0.64 7.63 0.55 7.52 0.62 7.56 0.48 
Log Yearly Hours 0.05 0.82 -0.27 0.44 -0.10 0.42 -0.01 0.86 -0.02 0.68 0.39 0.69 
Age 33.51 12.28 33.41 13.30 35.50 13.00 29.97 10.85 30.97 9.25 33.17 12.23 
Experience 19.42 13.82 19.81 14.96 21.32 15.10 13.94 13.02 16.55 11.37 20.04 13.16 
Illiterate 
(Reference) 
0.33 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.40 0.04 0.20 
Read&Write 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.28 
Primary 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.38 
Preparatory 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 
General Secondary 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.00 
University 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.23 0.43 0.13 0.34 
Post Graduate 0.27 0.45 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.21 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.51 
Greater 
Cairo(Referene) 
0.43 0.50 0.16 0.37 0.35 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.83 0.38 
Alex.&Sz Cnl. 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.04 0.20 
Lower Urban Egypt 0.22 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.45 0.19 0.40 0.04 0.20 
Upper Urban Egypt 0.21 0.41 0.42 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.28 
No. of Children 0-2 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.24 0.43 0.10 0.30 0.04 0.20 
No. of Children 3-6 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.13 0.34 
Log other Men’s 
Earnings 
3.27 2.85 3.01 2.65 3.07 2.74 3.70 2.82 3.86 2.94 4.04 2.99 
No. of Observations 261   69   63   34   34   62   
Source: Authour's calculations; ELMS 
(1998) 
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Figure 1: Average Yearly Working Hours By Wealth Index 
and Type of Employment, Urban Women, Egypt 1998  
 
Figure (1) shows private wage workers to be the hard working group, and the lowest 
wage earners too (according to Figure A-1 in the appendix). Except for the second cut off 
(20th-40th) they appear to be working more hours than the self employed or public sector 
workers. The figure also points to the fact that once self employed workers reach a higher 
level on the wealth index, they cut back their working hours, contrary to public and 
private workers. Public wage workers who fall in the second category (20th-40th 
percentile) seem to work the most of all workers in the sample. However, the small 
number of observations in this cell (3) makes it worthy of discounting. The reasoning 
applies to public workers falling in the lowest 20th percentile of the wealth index. 
 
Table (3) contains parameter estimates of the participation and wage equations (Heckman 
selection model). First, the insignificance of the selection term (inverse of mills ratio) is 
an indication that sample selection is not a problem. Tunali and Baslevent (2001) reached 
a similar conclusion. Negative age squared in the participation equation is an indication 
of shorter and interrupted spells of women’s labor force participation.  
 
The returns to experience in the wage equation show a concave experience-wage profile.  
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Being able to read and write, at the primary or preparatory levels of education are 
significant determinants of participating in the labor force. Having a secondary or post 
graduate degree is significant determinant of wages rates. The existence of young 
children between 0 and 2 years does not have any effect on work decision, but children 3 
to 6 years of age negatively influence that decision significantly. Contrary to classical 
theory assumption, other men’s earnings in the household increase the likelihood of 
participation in the labor market, suggesting that leisure is not a normal good.  
 
Table (3): Participation and Wage Equations 
(Heckman Selection Model) 
 
Variables Participation Equation Wage Equation 
Age 0.105 -0.033 
 (0.076) (0.037) 
Age Squared -0.093 0.053+ 
 (0.110) (0.027) 
Experience  0.020 
  (0.034) 
Experience Squared  -0.000+ 
  (0.000) 
Ability To Read &Write 0.322** 0.036 
  (0.000) (0.074) 
Primary 0.462** 0.074 
  (0.000) (0.069) 
Preparatory 0.552** 0.167 
  (0.000) (0.125) 
Secondary 0.365 0.224** 
  (0.300) (0.021) 
University -0.409 0.259 
  (0.345) (0.310) 
Post Graduate -0.370 0.457** 
 (0.381) (0.058) 
Alexandria & Suez Canal 0.372 -0.034 
  (0.333) (0.052) 
Lower Urban Egypt 0.434 -0.041 
  (0.311) (0.050) 
Upper Urban Egypt 0.464 -0.037 
 (0.307) (0.048) 
No. of Children 0-2 0.111  
 (0.132)  
No. of Children 3-6 -0.148*  
 (0.089)  
Log HH Male Earnings 0.128**  
 (0.045)  
Constant 0.100 0.194 
 (1.117) (0.453) 
Lambda              -1.224 
             (1.195) 
No. of Observations 4843 4843 
   Source: Author’s calculations; ELMS (1998) 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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6.2- The Hours (Labor Supply) Equations: 
Table (4) presents results of hours equations for self employed and private wage workers 
at five different thresholds: below 20th percentile, 20th-40th percentile, 40th-60th percentile, 
60th-80th percentile, and 80th-100th percentile. The coefficients of predicted log wages are 
the elasticities for those falling within a threshold. Table (4) confirms the stated 
hypothesis. The uncompensated elasticity of hours supplied with respect to own wages is 
negative and significant at the 5% level for the poorest group of workers. The same result 
applies to 20th-40th group, to the 60th-80th group and to the highest 20th percentile, though 
with different significance levels. As showed in the table, a ten percent cut in wages 
results in 0.54% increase in working hours for the poorest group. As the wealth level 
increase to the next threshold, a ten percent drop in wages results in an increase in 
working hours by 0.49%. The group which is considered the richest (for the purpose of 
this study) still does not cut much of their outside work hours. They increase their 
working hours by 0.39% if wages decline by ten percent. Put it differently, results of this 
study points to a negative labor supply elasticity that drops as the well being of 
households increases. This range of elasticities is comparable to Dessing (2003) 
estimates. 
 
These results support the previous claim that poor households depend on secondary 
workers, who are women most of the time, to satisfy their basic needs. Once these needs 
are met, women cut back on their outside labor and free some of their time to enhance the 
welfare of the family by taking care of the domestic chores.   
Table (4) also shows age is a factor in determining hours supplied, even after wage is 
considered, suggesting a life cycle role in this model. Workers with different levels of 
education appear to respond differently to a 10% drop in wages. Those with secondary 
education increase their work hours by a range of 0.34 -0.63%.  Whereas university 
educated workers increase their working hours by a range of 0.12-0.70% depending on 
their wealth status. 
 
Holding wages constant, the availability of, and probably access to, other men’s earnings 
as well as having children either in the 0-2 or the 3-6 age groups does not have any 
significant effect on hours of work. 
 
That means they have the opportunity to invest in training and education. However, these 
women find it difficult to perform either because of lack of time and funds. Provision of 
such training programs is essential for breaking the cycle at this stage. Introducing these 
programs must be accompanied by providing simultaneous programs aiming at reducing 
domestic work and provision of day care, for these programs to be successful. 
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Halting public sector hiring of graduates in Egypt in the 1990s, which further worsened 
employment opportunities, is likely to have had a conflicting impact on women’s labor 
supply, on the one hand by depressing the wage offered to women’s new entrants, on the 
other hand queuing in unemployment lines. In a study on women workers of Buenos 
Aires, Cerrutti M. (2000) found that most of women’s labor force participation growth 
has been in the self-employment sector, a result of falling job opportunities and labor 
conditions, and increasing levels of employment instability and unemployment among 
men primary earners. The same story may well be valid here, until further research. Will 
self-employment increase the men/women’s earnings inequality or raise the relative 
economic status of women? Programs aiding women to setup their income-generating 
activities represent only one step in that direction. 
 
Finally, policies should aim at promoting the available natural gift by promoting labor 
demand industries that make extensive use of women labor. Industries that are export-
oriented, or labor-intensive manufacturing, may well create the base for such course of 
action. 
 
 
 
Table (4): Log Hours Equations: Self Employed + Private Wage 
Workers 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Variables Below 20th 
Percentile 
20 th-40th  
Percentile 
40 th-60th  
Percentile 
60 th-80th  
Percentile 
80 th-100th  
Percentile 
Predicted Log Wage -0.541* -0.488** -0.377 -0.337+ -0.392** 
 (0.221) (0.195) (0.154) (0.180) (0.079) 
Age -0.157** -0.152** 0.034 0.168** -0.155** 
 (0.034) (0.050) (0.066) (0.004) (0.053) 
Age2 0.075 0.084 -0.084 -0.202* 0.083 
 (0.045) (0.064) (0.062) (0.093) (0.064) 
Ability To Read &Write -1.137** -0.082 0.000 -0.692 -0.376 
  (0.307) (0.333) (0.000) (0.545) (0.461) 
Primary -0.380 -0.205 -0.042 -0.247 -0.771 
  (0.277) (0.247) (0.450) (0.538) (0.494) 
Preparatory -1.652** -0.318 -0.387 0.000 -0.516 
  (0.398) (0.524) (0.567) (0.000) (0.720) 
Secondary -0.530** -0.340** -0.535** -0.632* -0.532 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.393) (0.420) 
University -0.350+ -0.306+ -0.669+ -0.127** -0.711* 
  (0.192) (0.164) (0.347) (0.001) (0.343) 
Post Graduate -0.197 0.119 -0.295 -0.018 -0.264 
  (0.396) (0.398) (0.340) (0.303) (0.397) 
No. of Children 0-2 -0.037 -0.292 -0.115 -0.398 -0.122 
  (0.222) (0.226) (0.240) (0.528) (0.260) 
No. of Children 3-6 -0.336+ 0.210 -0.168 -0.230 0.261 
  (0.177) (0.235) (0.264) (0.254) (0.218) 
Log HH Male Earnings 0.031 0.024 0.044 0.083 0.070+ 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.046) (0.050) (0.037) 
Lambda -2.140 -0.939 2.559 8.339 6.111 
 (4.085) (5.306) (4.233) (5.656) (4.841) 
Constant 8.696** 8.214** 7.773** 4.133* 8.471** 
 (0.664) (0.970) (0.974) (1.546) (1.091) 
No. of Observations 69 63 34 34 62 
R-squared 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.39 
Source: Author’s calculations; ELMS (1998) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Two general comments on Table (4): first, the low R2-values imply there is still a wide 
range of unidentified determinants explaining the decision to work extra hours or not. 
Second, these results suggest the category of 15-64 years is a diverse of a group to have 
one labor supply function. Thus, an analysis of the determinants of labor supply using a 
disaggregated database should be the focus of further empirical investigations. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Unlike what the classical theory of labor supply claims of positive elasticity at low levels 
of income (or wages), the analysis in this study found no evidence of such claim. At low 
income levels, or below some threshold, economic hardships are likely to press women to 
work longer hours to overcome their economic hardships. At the same time, they are 
responsible for home activities and child care. Thus, it is expected to get a negative 
elasticity for this sub-sample. At the same time, these women are responsible for home 
activities and child care. That’s probably why when conditions improve they withdraw 
from the labor market or work fewer hours. At higher levels of income, women transfer 
some or all of household activities to domestic laborer and join the labor market 
producing, again, negative elasticities. 
 
The negative labor supply schedule points to the need to limit exploiting workers at low 
wage rates and calls for imposing, and enforcing, minimum wage legislation.  Yet the 
lower work hours at intermediate and high wealth levels is a sign of a sigh of relief from 
the subsistence trap. During that time, women improve the welfare of their families by 
reducing their hours of work outside the house.
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Table (A-1): Scoring Coefficients, Mean and Standard Deviation of Assets 
Comprising the Wealth Factor In Urban Egypt, 1998 
Variable* Scoring Coefficient Mean Std. Dev. Coefficient/SD 
Quality of Walls 0.023 0.754 0.43 0.053 
Quality of floor 0.072 0.899 0.301 0.239 
Quality of roof 0.071 0.837 0.37 0.192 
Access to Piped water 0.032 0.978 0.148 0.216 
Availability of Waste Collection Services 0.05 0.366 0.482 0.104 
Own a Phone 0.109 0.455 0.498 0.219 
Connected to Sewer/Septic Tank** 0.055 1.733 0.524 0.105 
Access to Electricity 0.015 0.995 0.072 0.208 
Interest or Income From Dividends 0.027 0.032 0.175 0.154 
Own a Fridge 0.123 0.847 0.36 0.342 
Own a Freezer 0.037 0.06 0.238 0.155 
Own a Dishwasher 0.017 0.021 0.144 0.118 
Own a Colored TV 0.15 0.726 0.446 0.336 
Own a B&W TV -0.051 0.309 0.462 -0.110 
Own a Video 0.065 0.182 0.386 0.168 
Own an Air Condition 0.035 0.043 0.203 0.172 
Own a Microwave 0.008 0.015 0.123 0.065 
Own a Gas Stove 0.086 0.83 0.375 0.229 
Own a Kerosene Stove -0.058 0.474 0.499 -0.116 
Own an Electric Fan 0.082 0.762 0.426 0.192 
Own a Water Heater 0.144 0.475 0.499 0.289 
Own a Space Heater 0.044 0.082 0.275 0.160 
Own a Sewing Machine 0.037 0.222 0.416 0.089 
Own an Iron 0.118 0.768 0.422 0.280 
Own a Radio 0.062 0.815 0.388 0.160 
Own a Washing Machine 0.069 0.918 0.274 0.252 
Own a Camera 0.054 0.146 0.353 0.153 
Own a Bicycle 0.021 0.221 0.415 0.051 
Own a Scooter 0.004 0.02 0.142 0.028 
Own a Car 0.051 0.089 0.285 0.179 
Own a Taxi 0.006 0.009 0.097 0.062 
Own a Van 0.008 0.014 0.116 0.069 
No. of Rooms*** 0.035 3.74 1.307 0.027 
Source: Author's calculations; ELMS (1998)    
*All variables are binary (0,1) except otherwise indicated.   
**Takes the value 2 if connected to public sewer, value 1 If connected 
to septic tank, and zero otherwise 
   
**No. of rooms ranges from 1 to 12  
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Table (A-2): Means of Assets Included in First Principal Component According to Cut Off 
Points For Private Wage and Self Employed Workers 
      
  Below 20 th  20 th-40th  40 th-60th  60 th-80th  80 th-100th  
Variables* Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile 
Quality of Walls 0.681 0.817 0.882 0.871 0.958 
Quality of floor 0.609 0.933 0.971 0.968 1.000 
Quality of roof 0.507 0.800 0.971 0.968 1.000 
Access to Piped water 0.913 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Availability of Waste Collection Serv. 0.203 0.383 0.441 0.645 0.833 
Own a Phone 0.014 0.167 0.176 0.742 1.000 
Connected to Sewer/Septic Tank** 1.493 1.600 1.647 1.935 2.000 
Access to Electricity 0.957 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Interest or Income From Dividends 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Own a Fridge 0.304 0.833 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Own a Freezer 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.032 0.125 
Own a Dishwasher 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Own a Colored TV 0.116 0.633 0.853 1.000 1.000 
Own a B&W TV 0.667 0.517 0.235 0.097 0.083 
Own a Video 0.000 0.067 0.029 0.161 0.417 
Own an Air Condition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 
Own a Microwave 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Own a Gas Stove 0.362 0.867 0.971 0.935 1.000 
Own a Kerosene Stove 0.841 0.583 0.324 0.323 0.083 
Own an Electric Fan 0.449 0.633 0.941 0.935 1.000 
Own a Water Heater 0.000 0.067 0.412 0.839 0.958 
Own a Space Heater 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.097 0.208 
Own a Sewing Machine 0.101 0.183 0.176 0.258 0.542 
Own an Iron 0.203 0.733 0.971 1.000 1.000 
Own a Radio 0.565 0.717 0.971 0.935 0.958 
Own a Washing Machine 0.667 0.967 0.971 0.968 0.958 
Own a Camera 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.129 0.208 
Own a Bicycle 0.087 0.083 0.235 0.258 0.000 
Own a Scooter 0.029 0.000 0.029 0.032 0.042 
Own a Car 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.208 
Own a Taxi 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.042 
Own a Van 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 
No. of Rooms*** 2.942 3.133 3.088 3.645 4.000 
Overall Mean -1.482 -0.408 0.155 0.580 0.921 
No. of Observations 69 63 34 34 62 
Source: Author's calculations; ELMS (1998)     
*All variables are binary (0,1) except otherwise indicated.    
**Takes the value 2 if connected to public sewer, value 1 If connected 
to septic tank, and zero otherwise 
  
  
**No. of rooms ranges from 1 to 12   
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Table (A-3): Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the Analysis, 
Total Sample, Urban Women 16-64, Egypt 1998 
 
  Total Sample  < 20 th  Percentile 20 th-40th Percentile 40 th-60th Percentile 60 th-80th  Percentile 80 th-100th Percentile 
Variables Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Log Hourly Wage 7.55 0.63 7.57 0.76 7.56 0.64 7.62 0.52 7.49 0.57 7.57 0.44 
Log Yearly Hours 0.13 0.83 -0.25 0.46 -0.14 0.50 0.00 0.85 0.28 0.80 0.40 0.62 
Age 34.47 12.20 33.31 13.24 35.20 12.88 30.26 10.48 33.90 10.66 33.67 11.84 
Experience 19.85 13.66 19.50 14.82 20.66 15.00 14.05 12.70 18.44 11.85 19.50 12.69 
Illiterate (Reference) 0.28 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.32 0.03 0.18 
Read&Write 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.25 
Primary 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.35 
Preparatory 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 
General Secondary 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 
University 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.23 0.43 
Post Graduate 0.28 0.45 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Greater Cairo(Referene) 0.45 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.80 0.41 
Alex.&Sz Cnl. 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.31 
Lower Urban Egypt 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.18 
Upper Urban Egypt 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.25 
No. of Children 0-2 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.39 0.26 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.03 0.18 
No. of Children 3-6 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.46 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.13 0.35 
Log other Men’s Earnings 3.50 2.87 3.12 2.65 3.26 2.71 3.75 2.78 3.87 2.91 4.32 2.95 
No. of Observations 312   72   65   38   52   85   
Source: Authour's calculations; ELMS (1998)
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Table (A-4): Log Hours Equations: Self Employed + Public and Private Wage 
Workers 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Variables Below 20th 
Percentile 
20 th-40th  
Percentile 
40 th-60th  
Percentile 
60 th-80th  
Percentile 
80 th-100th  
Percentile 
Predicted Log Wage -0.534** -0.494** -0.384 -0.348* -0.377** 
 (0.201) (0.171) (0.125) (0.110) (0.067) 
Age -0.139** -0.130* 0.036 0.129** 0.107** 
 (0.035) (0.070) (0.041) (0.045) (0.039) 
Age2 0.056 0.054 -0.088 -0.029 0.007 
 (0.046) (0.064) (0.057) (0.055) (0.048) 
Ability To Read &Write -1.079** -0.006 0.000 -0.294 -0.483 
  (0.318) (0.343) (0.000) (0.501) (0.401) 
Primary -0.256 -0.187 -0.001 -0.419 -0.835+ 
  (0.282) (0.256) (0.414) (0.504) (0.422) 
Preparatory -1.543** -0.253 -0.470 -0.012 -0.499 
  (0.411) (0.539) (0.420) (0.332) (0.506) 
Secondary -0.533** -0.250** -0.378* -0.360* -0.059 
  (0.032) (0.048) (0.178) (0.056) (0.440) 
University -0.127** -0.273+ -0.630+ 0.264+ -0.500* 
  (0.061) (0.158) (0.307) (0.145) (0.251) 
Post Graduate -0.039 -0.254 -0.337 -0.068 -0.302 
  (0.404) (0.383) (0.299) (0.243) (0.342) 
No. of Children 0-2 -0.184 -0.412+ -0.012 -0.855** -0.053 
  (0.223) (0.224) (0.205) (0.236) (0.204) 
No. of Children 3-6 -0.242 0.053 -0.092 -0.143 0.125 
  (0.180) (0.235) (0.220) (0.164) (0.166) 
Log HH Male Earnings 0.019 0.022 0.035 -0.007 0.059* 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.027) (0.026) 
Lambda -2.292 -1.341 2.695 1.211 6.422 
 (4.201) (5.505) (3.917) (4.126) (3.920) 
Constant 8.263** 7.907** 7.721** 7.122** 7.441** 
 (0.668) (0.974) (0.852) (0.932) (0.835) 
No. of Observations 72 65 38 52 85 
R-squared 0.32 0.28 0.35 0.34 0.25 
Source: Author’s calculations; ELMS (1998) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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